

was no evidence of bias on the part of any of the tribunal members and familiarity with a case is not grounds for establishing bias.

As pointed out by the Local Board, mere familiarity with a case is insufficient to establish bias on the part of a judge. For example, in *Welch v. State*, 257 Ga. 197, 357 S.E.2d 70 (1987), the Supreme Court refused to hold that a judge was biased in a second murder trial of defendant when he had presided in defendant's first murder trial. In *Lyles v. State*, 221 Ga. App. 560, 472 SE.2d 132 (1996), the defendant claimed that the trial judge was biased because he had heard pre-trial motions and had ruled against the defendant. The Court of Appeals stated that the argument was without merit.

In the instant case, the tribunal members were retired educators who did not have any stake in the outcome of the case. Appellant did not show any actual bias on the part of any of the tribunal members. The State Board of Education, therefore, concludes that it was not an error for the tribunal to hear the case and make a decision.

During oral argument of this case, Appellant claimed that because the State Board of Education reversed the Local Board's decision in *Velma Cooper et al. v. Atlanta City Bd. of Educ.*, Case No. 2005-8 (Ga. SBE, Nov. 10, 2004), which involved two other vocational supervisors, then the Local Board should be reversed in the instant case. Appellant's argument, however, fails on two counts. First, in *Cooper*, the Local Board attempted to non-renew the contracts based upon "other good and sufficient cause," without showing that the employees had done anything wrong or failed to take necessary actions. In the instant case, the Local Board based its non-renewal on a reduction in staff due to a loss of students or cancellation of programs, which does not require any showing of improper conduct or lack of required action on the part of an employee. In the instant case, the Local Board showed that there had been a loss of students in the program and that the state had decreased its funding for vocational programs, thus meeting the requirements for non-renewal based upon a reduction in staff due to a loss of students or cancellation of programs. O.C.G.A. § 20-2-940(a)(6).

Secondly, Appellant never raised the issues that were raised in *Cooper*. "If an issue is not raised at the initial hearing, it cannot be raised for the first time when an appeal is made." *Hutcheson v. DeKalb Cnty. Bd. of Educ.*, Case No. 1980-5 (Ga. SBE, May 8, 1980). The State Board of Education, as an appellate body, is not authorized to consider matters that have not been raised before the Local Board. *Sharpley v. Hall Cnty. Bd. of Educ.*, 251 Ga. 54, 303 S.E.2d 9 (1983). Throughout, the only issue raised by Appellant has been that the tribunal members were biased. Appellant, therefore, cannot raise additional issues during oral argument that were not previously raised.

Based upon the foregoing, it is the opinion of the State Board of Education that the tribunal members were not biased and Appellant was not denied due process. Accordingly, the Local Board's decision is
SUSTAINED.

This _____ day of January 2005.

William Bradley Bryant
Vice Chairman for Appeals